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ABSTRACT 
Capacity decisions are among the most important operations decisions for companies. One of the 
potential outcomes of bad decisions is a resulting overcapacity. Although some textbooks treat 
overcapacity as an issue for individual companies, there are indications that it may be an industry 
wide issue. This paper describes the global regional aircraft industry, comparing the demand and 
available production capacity. A small number of companies is active in this industry and a larger 
number of companies are starting or planning to start production. Under these conditions, the 
probability of overcapacity is high. The analysis shows that a number of structural factors exist that 
cause individual regional jet manufacturers to make capacity decisions that are not beneficial for the 
industry as a whole. Overall, in this type of industry, once the decision has been made to offer a 
new aircraft type, manufacturers do not have many options to prevent overcapacity situations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Regional aircraft production has been targeted by a number of companies and governments, 
including several in industrially developing countries. Around a decade ago, the main competitors 
in regional turboprop aircraft were mostly based in industrially developed countries; British 
Aerospace (UK), Fokker (The Netherlands), ATR (Italy), Saab (Sweden). Currently, most of these 
companies have been replaced by other companies producing regional jets such as Embraer (Brazil) 
and Bombardier (Canada). There are several other companies that are either trying to enter the 
market with their products, such as IAe (Indonesia), AVIC (China) and RRJ (Russia), or that are 
currently barely surviving such as Fairchild-Dornier (Germany) and Rekkof (the Netherlands). 
In the large commercial aircraft manufacturing industry there are only two significant 
companies: Airbus and Boeing. For specific segments, e.g. jumbo aircraft, the market may not even 
be large enough to sustain two competitors. With the number of companies already involved in 
regional aircraft manufacturing and an additional number of companies planning to enter it, the 
question is whether the market can sustain so many producers or whether it will lead to problems 
with overcapacity. In this paper, this issue will be discussed. 
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PRODUCTION CAPACITY 
Capacity is one of the important structural, or long-term, design parameters for an organization 
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Hayes, Pisano and Upton, 1996; Hayes, Pisano, Upton and 
Wheelwright, 2005). Capacity decisions deal with the amount, the timing, and the type of capacity 
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984: 31). A capacity strategy is a longer-term sequence of capacity 
decisions which are triggered by a capital authorization request for an expansion of capacity (Hayes 
and Wheelwright, 1984: 46). A capacity strategy is based on a series of assumptions and predictions 
about long-term market, technology, and competitive behavior. These include: (1) the predicted 
growth and variability of primary demand, (2) the costs of building and operating different sized 
plants, (3) the rate and direction of technological evolution, (4) the likely behavior of competitors, 
and (5) the anticipated impact of international competitors, markets, and sources of supply (Hayes 
and Wheelwright, 1984: 46). 
Hayes and Wheelwright (1984: 47) state that it is sometimes difficult to define or measure 
capacity. For example, it can be physical space, equipment, output rates, human resource 
capabilities, materials, or a combination. Finch (2006: 481) makes a similar statement and identifies 
several resource groups that contribute to capacity such as: labor capacity, equipment capacity, 
packaging capacity, equipment maintenance capacity, sales force capacity, inventory storage 
capacity, facility capacity, and material receiving capacity. Hayes and Wheelwright (1984: 47) 
therefore argue that capacity requires a statement of how much of what kinds of capacity are to be 
provided in conjunction with a specific scenario describing the likely evolution of the firm’s 
environment over time. 
Because of the importance of capacity decisions, operations management textbooks typically 
describe how companies should take their decisions. For example Stevenson (2005: 175) describes 
the capacity planning process in eight steps: 
• Estimate future capacity requirements 
• Evaluate existing capacity and facilities and identify gaps 
• Identify alternatives for meeting requirements 
• Conduct financial analysis of each alternative 
• Assess key qualitative issues for each alternative 
• Select one alternative to pursue 
• Implement the selected alternative 
• Monitor the results 
One of the main challenges in capacity decisions is to match capacity with demand, as 
Stevenson (1984: 169) states: “The goal of strategic capacity planning is to achieve a match 
between the long-term supply capabilities of an organization and the predicted level of long-term 
demand”. Unevenness in demand may lead to underutilization or overcapacity. Some of the typical 
strategies discussed in capacity decision are to add capacity proactively, neutral or reactively 
(Davis, Aquilano and Chase, 2003; Russell and Taylor, 2006; Heizer and Render, 2004). There are 
several problems with these approaches. First, it often assumes demand growth, see e.g. (Davis, 
Aquilano and Chase, 2003: p. 308; Heizer and Render, 2004: 280; Russell and Taylor, 2006: 246). 
This may not apply to regional aircraft manufacturing which may have more of a cyclical demand. 
Second, in manufacturing situations, it is often assumed that companies have the opportunity to 
buffer capacity from demand swings by utilizing inventory build up, see e.g. (Finch, 2006: 489). 
However, in regional aircraft manufacturing this condition may not be true since there are high 
costs associated with the storage of completed aircraft in inventory. Third, there is often some 
implicit assumption about the flexible use of capacity. For example, Heizer and Render (2004: 279) 
suggest that in cases of seasonal or cyclical demand patterns, management may find it helpful to 
offer products with complementary demand patters. This assumes that capacity can easily be used 
for different products and that a company can offer these different types of products. These 
conditions do not hold for regional aircraft manufacturers. Fourth, the theories often ignore the 
influence of competitors, i.e. they do not take actions from competitors into account. This may be 
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satisfactory for industries with many companies where each company’s capacity decisions have a 
minimal influence on the overall industry capacity. However, there are only a few regional aircraft 
manufacturers and each manufacturer’s capacity decisions have important implications for the other 
manufacturers.  
The above discussion shows that the commonly taught theories on capacity decision making are 
insufficient for regional aircraft manufacturers. 
 
OVERCAPACITY 
As indicated in the introduction section, the regional aircraft manufacturers may be dealing with an 
overcapacity situation. Overcapacity is not uncommon in several industries. For example in sectors 
of the chemical industry overcapacity occurs frequently (Young, 1999). Overcapacity may lead to a 
reduction in prices (Adams, 1999) or even a depletion of natural resources such as for example a 
fish population (Vitalis, 2003). To solve overcapacity either demand needs to increase or capacity 
needs to be scrapped. The question is what leads to industry overcapacity? 
Some practical examples are used here for illustrative purposes. One example is overcapacity in 
global chemical shipping at the end of the 1990s (Young, 1999). From 1982-1997 the marine 
chemical transportation growth rate was 5% a year worldwide. Then, in mid-1997 due to the Asia 
crisis, the industry faltered, seaborne trade in chemical products declined 1% in 1998. Prior to the 
crisis, chemical shipowners had anticipated continued demand growth and ordered new ships. “It 
was a good market in 1995-96…Everyone thought it would continue into 1997-98” (Young, 1999: 
45). Shipbuilding had also become les expensive, attracting operators to an already overcrowded 
market. In 1998, the global fleet expanded by 6%. Also, fewer ships were being scrapped, many 
ships were not demolished after the traditional 25 years of service. As Young (1999:45) states 
“Confident of continued growth, chemical tanker operators ordered ships years before scrapping 
decisions were due”. One owner of a fleet of chemical tankers stated “The world economy was 
growing so fast that we made sure our vessels were delivered before the older ships were 
scrapped…We all erred on the side of caution so that we would not lose market share by scrapping 
and then have to regain it with new ships. We have a great deal of replacement in mind, but the 
question is when to act.” (Young, 1999: 45). The oversupply in the chemical shipping sector is 
estimated at 30% - 35% and has caused a 10% - 20% fall in freight rates on major routes (Young, 
1999). In this example, overcapacity was a result forecasting errors. If demand is forecasted to 
increase, based on which companies add capacity, and actual demand decreases then a situation of 
overcapacity occurs. The overcapacity situation was exacerbated because old capacity, which was 
expected to be scrapped, was not scrapped. This may partly be caused by cautious capacity 
expansion decisions where new capacity is added before the old capacity needs to be scrapped. 
Furthermore, another complicating factor may be that the decision to add capacity, due to the lead 
time of building the capacity, may have to be far in advance. Therefore, industries with demand 
uncertainty and/or industries where capacity decisions are made far in advance may me more 
susceptible to overcapacity situations. 
Dearden, Lilien and Yoon (1999) provide an example of capacity for markets where product 
differentiation is marginal. In these markets, prices are typically set by the supply-demand balance 
in the market place (Dearden, Lilien and Yoon, 1999). Dearden, Lilien and Yoon (1999: 59) state 
“The dynamics in many high capital investment markets produce cycles of various sorts…Firms, 
driven by the desire to capture new customers and to satisfy and retain existing customers invest in 
production capacity. When market demand fails to match production capacity, costs rise, prices fall 
and firms may selectively delete capacity. So, all competing firms simultaneously balance two 
objectives: they weigh their desire to capture market share through assurance of supply by building 
production capacity against their desire to keep capacity utilization high by not building or even 
divesting production capacity. Although in a monopoly a firm might tune its production capacity to 
track demand cycles optimally, such coordination cannot occur naturally in an oligopoly when firms 
make decisions independently.” Dearden, Lilien and Yoon (1999) argue that demand forecasts are a 
 
EurOMA International Conference on 
Operations and Global Competitiveness  
 
 
Budapest, Hungary, June 19-22, 2005 
primary reason for cyclical behavior and they built several scenarios for firm actions. They 
conclude that among other things flexible manufacturing systems, sharing or reallocating 
production capacity with other, countercyclical products can help. In other words, companies that 
face cyclical industries should strive to be flexible or offer additional countercyclical products. 
Porter (1980) discusses capacity from an industry viewpoint. According to Porter (1980: 328) 
the risk of overbuilding capacity is most severe in commodity businesses for two reasons. The 
demand is generally cyclical this not only guarantees overcapacity in downturns but also seems to 
lead to excessively optimistic expectations in upturns. Second, commodity products are not 
differentiated, this factor makes costs crucial to competition. Also, the absence of brand loyalty 
means that firms’ sales are closely tied to the amount of capacity they have. Thus, firms are under 
great pressure to have large, modern plants to be competitive and adequate capacity to achieve their 
target market share. Porter (1980: 328-334) identified a range of factors that may contribute to 
overcapacity, see table 1. Porter (1980: 35-338) offers some solutions to prevent overcapacity to 
occur. However, these are primarily preemptive strategies. It is questionable whether this works in 
regional aircraft manufacturing because there are limited players and these players do not 
necessarily have flexibility to move into other types of businesses. 
 
Table 1 – Factors that contribute to overcapacity 
Technological Adding capacity in large lumps 
 Economies of scale or a significant learning curve 
 Long lead times in adding capacity 
 Increased minimum efficient scale 
 Changes in production technology 
Structural Significant exit barriers 
 Forcing by suppliers 
 Building credibility 
 Integrated competitors 
 Capacity share affects demand 
 Age and type of capacity affects demand 
Competitive Large number of firms 
 Lack of credible market leaders 
 New entry 
 First mover advantages 
Information flow Inflation of future expectations 
 Divergent assumptions or perceptions 
 Breakdown of market signaling 
 Structural change 
 Financial community pressure 
Managerial Production orientation of management 
 Asymmetric aversion to risk 
Governmental Perverse tax incentives 
 Desire for indigenous industry 
 Pressures to increase or maintain employment 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Our purpose is to explore capacity for regional aircraft manufacturers. This industry may be faced 
with overcapacity. We want to determine how companies are dealing with capacity decisions and, 
in the case of overcapacity, whether there are specific strategies that the companies may follow. For 
our analysis, we use a mix of primary and secondary data, i.e. data that has been published on the 
aircraft industry from a variety of sources including manufacturers and industry data from industry 
publications such as Flight International. We look at capacity from an output perspective, i.e. 
capacity is determined by how many aircraft companies produce. Regional jets are defined as small 
jet aircraft, i.e. no more than approximately 100 passengers, for short flights, i.e. 200-1500 nautical 
miles. 
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FINDINGS 
The demand for regional jet aircraft is provided in table 2, which is adapted from (O’Toole and 
Moxon, 1996; O’Toole, 1997; O’Toole, 1998; Kingsley-Jones, 1999; Kingsley-Jones, 2000; 
Kingsley-Jones, 2001; Kingsley-Jones, 2002; Kingsley-Jones, 2003; Kingsley-Jones, 2004; 
Kingsley-Jones, 2005). Table 2 includes the regional jet manufacturers that were active from 1994 
until 2004. Fairchild-Dornier went bankrupt in 2002 but AvCraft took over the 328Jet and Fairchild 
Dornier Industries the 728Jet production. Table 2 shows the orders placed with regional jet 
manufacturers as well as the creation of a back-log. Backlog is created for several reasons. First, 
airlines typically start their aircraft purchasing decisions up to four years in advance and delivery of 
the last aircraft from an order can take place six or more years after the order is placed. In other 
words, the backlog is about future demand. Second, Aircraft production has long through-put-times, 
i.e. there is quite a time difference between the start and finish of the production of an aircraft. 
Consequently, aircraft manufacturers need to know well in advance of delivery dates how many 
aircraft are required to be able to schedule their production. For example, Boeing decided to close 
its 757 production line in October 2003 when the order backlog was 12 aircraft of which the last 
were expected to manufactured by the end of 2004 (Norris, 2003). Similarly, Boeing decided to 
close its 717 production line in January 2005 because its order backlog was only 32 and these were 
due to be delivered by early 2006 (Wastnage, 2005). In other words, the appearance of backlog in 
this industry is not a signal of under capacity but is a consequence of the lead times involved in 
ordering and producing aircraft. In a sense, rather than inventories of finished aircraft, 
manufacturers use ‘inventories of orders’ (backlog) to adjust capacity to changing demand patterns. 
 
Table 2 - Net Regional Aircraft Orders and Backlog 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
AvCraft          12 18 
AVIC I          35 0 
BAe 25 37 12 32 9 2 17 -1 0 4 0 
Bombardier 33 38 58 156 190 173 228 230 36 72 130 
Embraer 13 5 45 121 192 161 418 30 19 139 108 
Fairchild Dornier    17 27 172 63 53 -176 0 - 
Fairchild Dornier 
Industries 
         0 - 
Fokker 29 47 0 0 0 0 - - - - - 
TOTAL 100 127 115 326 418 508 726 312 -121 262 256 
Total backlog 144 167 144 348 609 880 1286 1228 803 747 657 
 
Regional jet deliveries are provided in table 3, which is adapted from (O’Toole and Moxon, 
1996; O’Toole, 1997; O’Toole, 1998; Kingsley-Jones, 1999; Kingsley-Jones, 2000; Kingsley-
Jones, 2001; Kingsley-Jones, 2002; Kingsley-Jones, 2003; Kingsley-Jones, 2004; Kingsley-Jones, 
2005). 
 
Table 3 - Regional Aircraft Deliveries 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
AvCraft          7 8 
AVIC I          0 0 
BAe 26 21 26 22 20 23 15 10 0 4 0 
Bombardier 26 41 52 61 75 82 99 148 180 221 175 
Embraer 0 0 4 31 60 97 157 153 121 87 134 
Fairchild Dornier    0 0 15 33 31 8   
Fairchild Dornier 
Industries 
         0  
Fokker 30 41 17 5 0       
TOTAL 82 103 99 119 155 217 304 342 309 319 317 
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Stevenson (2004; 171) distinguishes two types of capacity. Design capacity is the maximum 
output rate or service capacity an operation, process, or facility is designed for. Effective capacity is 
the design capacity minus allowances such as personal time, maintenance, and scrap. Design 
capacity is the maximum rate of output under ideal condition. Effective capacity is usually less than 
design capacity owing to the realities of changing product mix, the need for periodic maintenance of 
equipment, lunch breaks, coffee breaks, problems in scheduling and balancing operations, and 
similar circumstances. Furthermore, Stevenson (2004; 171) states that the actual output cannot 
exceed effective capacity, and is often less because of machine breakdowns, absenteeism, shortages 
of materials, and quality problems, as well as factors that are outside of the control of the operations 
managers.  
Since we do not know the design capacity of the different regional aircraft manufacturers, we 
use the actual output as an estimate of the effective capacity. As outlined above, the effective 
capacity is usually higher and therefore this can be considered a rather conservative indicator. To 
determine the industry capacity, we look at existing companies and their maximum production rate 
per year over the last 10-year period as an indicator of the effective capacity. For companies that are 
starting up their production, their estimated production rates are used as an indication of their 
planned capacity. This is shown in table 4. Estimated production rates for Rekkof, a company that 
plans to continue the production of Fokker aircraft, are based on (Rekkof, 2005), for AvCraft and 
Embraer Harbin they are based on (Goold, 2004). 
Numbers for Fairchild Dornier Aeroindustries, AVIC I, Sukhoi, and Japan are not (yet) 
available. Fairchild Dornier Aeroindustries, was formed after the bankruptcy of Fairchild Dornier. 
The 728Jet line was purchased by D’Long Aerospace, which later renamed it to Fairchild Dornier 
Aerospace. Fairchild Dornier Aerospace itself had problems and filed for insolvency in 2003 
making the future of the 728Jet uncertain (Goold, 2004). AVIC I is currently producing the ARJ21 
prototype, it started cutting the first metal in January 2004 and hopes to fly the prototype in 2006 
for first deliveries late in 2007 (Flight International, 2004c). A Sukhoi led consortium is working on 
the RRJ. This will be the first Russian aircraft designed from scratch to meet Western certification 
standards. Prototypes are planned to be completed in 2005 with first deliveries late in 2007 (Goold, 
2004). JADC from Japan is at an earlier stage. Currently it carries out feasibility studies for an 
indigenous regional jet. The Japanese government has been focusing on regional jets for a longer 
time. Approximately 10 years ago it was already looking into the YS-X, a 100-seat regional jet, but 
it gave up these plans in 1998 to focus more on components and subsystem technologies (Flight 
International, 1998). However, in 2002 it again initiated studies on a 30-seat regional jet (Doyle, 
2002) and a 150-seat regional jet (Sobie, 2003). 
 
Table 4 - Indicators for Effective Capacity 
Manufacturer Maximum output rate per year Estimated production rate per 
year 
AvCraft (328Jet)  54 
AVIC I (ARJ21)  Not available 
Bombardier 221  
Embraer 157  
Embraer Harbin  24 
Fairchild Dornier Aeroindustries 
(728Jet) 
 Not available 
JADC  Not available 
Rekkkof (Fokker)  45 
Sukhoi (RRJ)t  Not available 
 
Based on table 4 it can be inferred that a conservative estimate for the production capacity of the 
two ‘stable’ manufacturers Bombardier and Embraer is approximately 380 aircraft per year. 
Furthermore, maximum capacities for other manufacturers add another 110 aircraft per year 
(excluding ARJ and RRJ). So the projected capacity is somewhere around 500 aircraft per year. 
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Considering the demand levels over the last decade this is quite a high number indicating that there 
is overcapacity. 
Another indication comes from forecasted demand. Frequently, mistakes are made with these 
forecasts which can cause overcapacity. For example, due to slackening of sales, Bombardier had to 
trim its CRJ200 production in 2004 (Flight International, 2004a). Embraer, cut back its two year 
delivery forecast by 12% in 2004 (Shannon, 2004) and AvCraft cut its forecast from between 700 to 
1200 aircraft to between 250-350 aircraft (Norris, 2004). Table 5 provides the adjusted forecasted 
demand by Embraer for regional jets for the next 20 years, based on (Flight International 2004b). 
 
Table 5 - Forecasted Demand for Regional Jets 
Period 30-60 seat 61-90 seat 91-120 seat Total 
2005-2014 650 1300 1250 3200 
2015-2024 1300 1550 1750 4600 
 
Table 5 shows that the total forecasted demand until 2014 is 3200 regional jets, which translates 
in a demand for approximately 320 aircraft per year. As shown above, the combined capacity of 
Bombardier and Embraer can easily fill this demand which again shows that this industry is faced 
with overcapacity especially if other companies enter the market. 
Table 6 shows projected production quantities for Embraer and Bombardier for the next five 
years, based on (Jaworowski, 2005). 
 
Table 6 - Forecasted Production Quantities 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Bombardier 143 120 117 104 110 
Embraer 135 135 142 141 143 
 
Table 6 shows that both manufacturers expect to stay under their maximum output levels. Also, 
very interestingly, Embraer is forecasting a relatively stable production rate which is quite strange 
considering the many fluctuations in production rates in the past decade. 
 
Causes for Overcapacity 
The discussion above shows that overcapacity is an important issue in regional aircraft production. 
Overcapacity occurs because of several specific factors that influence this industry. Several of these 
are mentioned by Porter (1980). Where the factors deviate from Porter (1980) we will specifically 
mention it in our discussion below. 
First, capacity gets added in large lumps. To be able to produce more aircraft typically requires 
that a whole series of jigs has to be duplicated and a separate manufacturing line needs to be set up. 
Although when demand declines producers can decide to use less labor, the fixed costs for these 
jigs remain and they can not be sold or used for other types of production. 
Second, there is a significant learning curve in aircraft production. This translates into 
economies of scale and hence there is a force on manufacturers to produce many aircraft and have a 
high capacity. The typical break-even point for aircraft production is around 500-600 aircraft. 
Third, there are, compared to other industries, relatively long lead-times in adding production 
capacity. On the one hand, adding production capacity requires for example more jigs, these have to 
be produced or which takes time. On the other hand, it may also require adding new labor, these 
have to be trained which also takes time. Our conversations with airlines indicate that airlines notice 
when production rates go up at aircraft producers because these airlines subsequently experience 
more quality problems that are the result of less experienced production workers. 
Fourth, there are significant exit barriers. This industry uses rather specific skill sets and 
equipment combined with huge investments which make it very hard to exit the industry other than 
by bankruptcy. As a consequence, capacity is not easily removed from the industry. For example, 
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even though Fokker and Fairchild Dornier both went bankrupt, their products are either still 
produced (328Jet) or there are plans for continued production (728Jet and Fokker 70 and 100). 
Fifth, in contrast with Porter (1980) it is a small number of firms that leads to overcapacity. The 
problem is related to the break-even point of 500-600 aircraft. Once a manufacturer decides to 
produce an aircraft it needs to produce a significant number of aircraft to break-even. Table 5 shows 
that expected demand for the next 10 years is around 3200 aircraft. This shows that the required 
capacity for a single aircraft is a substantial number considering the total demand for aircraft and it 
also has a big impact on actions and reactions from the few competitors. This aspect is also 
illustrated by the numerous announcements of aircraft manufacturers for new aircraft types. Many 
of these programs are never carried out to fruition, for example the 428Jet, 928Jet, Fokker 130, 
BRJ-X. 
Sixth, there are often political motives for indigenous aircraft production. Consequently, nations 
build up aircraft production capacity that might not have happened under strict free market 
principles, especially for start-up or relatively new or not yet established companies in the market. 
Examples are IAe from Indonesia, AVIC from China and the Sukhoi led RRJ. Eight, there are 
political motives for employment which may keep aircraft capacity in place much longer than 
would be warranted by free market principles. Since the number of people involved in aircraft 
production is high, the loss of employment by terminating an aircraft program or reducing 
production rates can be high. For example, during the downturn in the early 2000s, Boeing cut its 
workforce by more than 35,000 jobs (Daniel, 2003). With these types of job cuts, there is a lot of 
pressure to keep producing. For countries with more restrictive labor laws than in the US, it may 
also be more difficult to lay-off people. 
Seventh, and in addition to Porter (1980), this industry is characterized by high technology 
investments. Not being able to offer the latest technologies and/or products can easily lead to 
bankruptcy. In combination with this, it makes it hard to forecast the market and the potential 
companies in the market. In other words, each individual company can not easily make decisions 
based on whether other companies are already active in the market or planning to be active in the 
market because in a few years time these companies may not exist any more. 
Eigth, also in addition to Porter (1980) the life of aircraft programs complicate matters. Aircraft 
typically fly for 20 or more years. Due to this, it is difficult for aircraft manufacturers to keep their 
research and design departments active. This drives the search for new markets and new aircraft 
types or derivatives which leads to overcapacity. 
Ninth, forecasting is difficult. In the regional jet market, in the last 10 years there was 
considerable growth leading to capacity investments from a number of companies. This growth was 
partly due to the fact that it was a new market, i.e. the demand for regional jets was caused by 
airlines replacing their turboprop aircraft with jets. However, the market has caught up with this 
trend and growth has slowed down leading to recently revised forecasts from the manufacturers. 
Regional jet sales patterns are now likely to show similar cyclical behavior as large aircraft sales. 
All in all, one of the key elements that causes overcapacity is that the capacity for aircraft 
production is rather inflexible. A high capacity is needed in order to break-even but a lot of the tools 
for aircraft production are specific to a specific aircraft. Hence, an aircraft manufacturer does not 
have a lot of flexibility in times of low demand to move resources around aside from the fact that 
producers typically only produce a few aircraft types. Once an aircraft manufacturer has made the 
decision to produce, it is pretty much stuck with the decision and overcapacity is a continuous 
threat. Each of the limited number of producers is therefore stuck with a type of prisoner dilemma. 
If all of them develop new aircraft, they are likely to have loss making operations because they do 
not reach the break-even point. If none of them develop new aircraft, they are missing out on 
market opportunities. But if only one producer designs a new aircraft, it will probably be able to 
take advantage and have high profits. The prisoner dilemma is confounded because companies can 
not be sure who will be involved in the industry in the medium to long term. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we studied regional aircraft manufacturing. This industry is currently characterized by 
having two major companies; Bombardier and Embraer, but a number of other companies are in the 
process of getting involved in producing aircraft also leading to a potential problem of overcapacity 
in the industry. The theory on capacity decisions shows that most common theories implicitly 
assume that there is either growth in demand or that manufacturers are flexible in using their 
capacity. Theories on overcapacity show that some causes for overcapacity are known but solutions 
on dealing with overcapacity, other than preemptive strategies, are not provided. Our analysis 
shows that regional aircraft manufacturers are continuously faced with overcapacity threats due to 
industry characteristics such as high break-even point, long lead-times, and inflexible 
manufacturing systems. We conclude that regional aircraft manufacturers are faced with a type of 
prisoner dilemma and that once the decision has been made to develop a new aircraft type, the 
aircraft manufacturers do not have many options to adjust their capacity strategy. 
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